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A 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
    
 dvances in nanotechnology have increasingly been facilitating novel ap-
plications in a wide range of fields including materials, electronics, photon-
ics, biotechnology and life sciences. The ability to design and manipulate 
molecules with specific properties at the nanoscale level allows scientists to 
achieve outcomes that are of potential use in hostilities, including—but by 
no means limited to—increased electrical efficiency of solid-state laser 
weapons;1 enhanced or tailored blast and detonation parameters of blast 
weapons, such as thermobaric explosives using nano-energetic composites;2 
miniaturization of unmanned aerial vehicles (known as “nano air vehicles,” 
“ultra-lightweight airborne vehicles” or “wide area search autonomous at-
tack miniature munitions”) that can also operate collectively in a coordinat-
ed, self-organized manner with the use of swarm intelligence technology;3 
and controlled, sustained delivery of biochemical agents, which could limit 
and regulate the spread of biochemical agents and other toxins within de-
fined parameters.4 
                                                                                                                      
1. In April 2013 the U.S. Navy announced plans to deploy for the first time a solid-
state laser weapon aboard USS Ponce, which has been developed through the Solid State 
Laser Technology Maturation Program. Jason Kelly, Navy Unveils Its First Laser Gun, NAVY 
LIFE (Apr. 10, 2013), http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/04/10/solid-state-laser-gun-to-be-
placed-aboard-uss-ponce/. For information on the program, see Solid State Laser Technology 
Maturation Program, ONR (Sept. 2012), http://www.onr.navy.mil/Media-Center/Fact-
Sheets/Solid-State-Laser-Technology-Maturation-Program.aspx.  
2. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE, DEFENSE NANOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 6–7 
(2009), available at http://www.nano.gov/sites/default/files/pub_resource/dod-report 
_to_congress_final_1mar10.pdf; Andrzej W. Miziolek, Nanoenergetics: An Emerging Technolo-
gy Area of National Importance, AMPTIAC NEWSLETTER, Spring 2002, at 43, 44. 
3. Press Release, U.S. Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, Time Magazine Rec-
ognizes DARPA’s Hummingbird Nano Air Vehicle (Nov. 24, 2011), available at http:// auto-
motive-area.blogspot.com/2011/11/time-magazine-recognizes-darpas.html [hereinafter 
DARPA Press Release]; William A. Davis, Nano Air Vehicles: A Technology Forecast (2007), 
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/bh_davis.pdf. On April 14, 2015, 
the U.S. Office of Naval Research announced recent technology demonstrations of 
swarming unmanned aerial vehicles as part of the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology 
(LOCUST) program. Press Release, Office of Naval Research, LOCUST: Autonomous, 
Swarming UAVs Fly into the Future (Apr. 14, 2015), available at http://www.onr.navy. 
mil/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2015/LOCUST-low-cost-UAV-swarm-ONR.aspx. 
4. See, e.g., MARGARET E. KOSAL, NANOTECHNOLOGY FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOG-
ICAL DEFENSE 90–93 (2009). 
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While these novel applications of nanotechnology for military purposes 
are not specifically prohibited by any weapons treaties, the employment of 
the means of warfare enhanced by nanotechnology must comply with the 
various requirements of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). The application 
of the relevant rules to specific nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced 
weapons, or even to conventional means of warfare in an environment 
where engineered nanoparticles are widely and heavily used, may pose chal-
lenges in terms of how the relevant LOAC rules should be interpreted in 
light of the specific characteristics of the weapon or the weapon system 
and its effects in the battlefield.5 Yet, those are the challenges that need to 
be—and can be—resolved through rigorous debate on the interpretation 
and application of relevant principles and rules in each specific context, 
rather than requiring or demanding changes to them. Commanders play a 
key role in ensuring that new technology weapons, including nanotechnol-
ogy-enabled or -enhanced weapons, comply with the law when they are 
employed, leaving no accountability gap no matter how technologies 
evolve.6   
Notwithstanding the enduring value and relevance of the LOAC prin-
ciples and rules developed over several hundred years and through lessons 
learned from their application in armed conflict, there remains room for 
those principles and rules to change through State practice and agreement, 
often informed by technological advances and their perceived impact on 
the battlefield. 7  As Michael Schmitt has most relevantly observed, 
                                                                                                                      
5. For details, see the author’s earlier studies. Hitoshi Nasu, Nanotechnology and the Law 
of Armed Conflict, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 143 (Hi-
toshi Nasu & Robert McLaughlin eds., 2014); Hitoshi Nasu, Nanotechnology and Challenges to 
International Humanitarian Law: A Preliminary Legal Assessment, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF THE RED CROSS 653 (2012); Hitoshi Nasu & Tom Faunce, Nanotechnology and the Interna-
tional Law of Weaponry: Towards International Regulation of Nano-Weapons, 20 JOURNAL OF LAW, 
INFORMATION AND SCIENCE 20 (2010). 
6. Similarly, in relation to autonomous weapon systems, see Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Ex-
amining Autonomous Weapon Systems from a Law of Armed Conflict Perspective, in NEW TECH-
NOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 213; Kenneth Anderson, 
Daniel Reisner & Matthew Waxman, Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weap-
on Systems, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 386, 405 (2014). 
7. Cf. Barry Kellman, Of Guns and Grotius, 7 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
& POLICY 465 (2014) (observing international law’s failure to adequately appreciate the 
impact of explosive weapons).  
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“[t]echnology determines how wars can be fought.”8 Law, on the other 
hand, determines how wars should be fought, which necessarily interacts 
with how wars can be fought as it changes with the introduction of new tech-
nologies onto the battlefield. This article considers the potential of military 
applications of nanotechnology to drive changes to the existing law, with 
specific focus on its ability to produce more sophisticated, miniaturized and 
tailored weapons and weapon systems that enable mechanical precision of 
strikes with no or few civilian casualties. To that end, it critically revisits the 
fundamental rationales—particularly military necessity and humanity—
underpinning various principles and rules of weapons law, questioning 
whether and to what extent the existing balancing of those fundamental 
rationales can withstand pragmatic changes introduced by nanotechnology. 
In order to avoid unnecessary academic discussion of unlikely hypo-
theticals for the purpose of pure academic interest, this article proceeds 
with two important limitations on the premise upon which the analysis is 
developed: technological feasibility (at least in a foreseeable future) and 
practical utility. There are many wild speculations about what nanotechnol-
ogy may enable us to produce—such as autonomous, self-replicating 
“nano-bots” (nano-scale machines) and micro-fusion nuclear weapons—
however, it is doubtful whether these are technologically feasible within the 
period addressed in this article.9 Scientists are indeed working towards min-
iaturization of unmanned aerial vehicles, as demonstrated by the United 
States’ Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s “nano air vehicles” 
program,10 yet further miniaturization to micro- or nano-sized robots is at 
least a few decades away. The development of artificial intelligence is mak-
ing parallel progress, yet it will take decades before autonomous weapon 
systems will be capable of compliance with targeting law requirements,11 
and even longer for it to be miniaturized to a size that is sufficiently small 
to be installed on “nano-bots” to enable their autonomous operation.  
                                                                                                                      
8. Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF 
WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WEAPONRY AND THE USE OF FORCE 137, 137 (Anthony M. 
Helm ed., 2006) (Vol. 82, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). 
9. For a physicist’s perspective, see JÜRGEN ALTMANN, MILITARY NANOTECHNOLO-
GY: POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS AND PREVENTIVE ARMS CONTROL 27–31, 100–101 
(2006).  
10. DARPA Press Release, supra note 3. 
11. Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of Con-
temporary Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36 
Weapons Reviews, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 483, 491 (2012).  
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Even if these were technologically feasible options, the actual employ-
ment of those weapons in the way that commentators are speculating may 
not be practically viable. For example, weaponization of artificial intelli-
gence with the capacity to operate beyond pre-programmed parameters 
through autonomous learning now appears to be feasible.12 However, em-
ploying autonomous weapon systems that independently operate beyond 
pre-programmed parameters may not practically serve the interest of the 
commanders, who would rather use them to gather high fidelity infor-
mation in order to permit reassessment of constantly changing situations, 
and in a manner that ensures they operate exactly as commanders direct to 
support the achievement of specific military objectives.  
With these two limitations in mind, this article first explains how the 
existing principles and rules of weapons law regulate military applications 
of nanotechnology in light of the specific characteristics of the weapons 
that will be enabled or enhanced by the use of nanotechnology. Second, it 
examines the transformative impact of nanotechnology-enabled or 
-enhanced weapons on existing weapons law. In doing so, it dissects the 
law into its constitutive elements of military necessity and humanity, while 
identifying two different understandings of humanity: one concerning the 
protection of civilians from armed attack and the other concerning the pro-
tection of lawful targets from certain means and methods of warfare. 
Third, it further explores the potential of nanotechnology to drive a change 
to existing weapons law by contextualizing this question against two aca-
                                                                                                                      
12 . See, e.g., Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control through Deep Reinforcement 
Learning, 518 NATURE 529 (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/ 
v518/n7540/full/nature14236.html. The potential development of this capability raises 
concerns for its ability to comply with the targeting law requirements under the law of 
armed conflict and also for a potential accountability gap. See, e.g., Marco Sassóli, Autono-
mous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Le-
gal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 308 (2014); Tim McFarland & 
Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous Weapons Systems be Liable for 
War Crimes?, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 361 (2014); Chantal Grut, The Challenge of 
Autonomous Lethal Robotics to International Humanitarian Law, 18 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & 
SECURITY LAW 5 (2013); David Akerson, The Illegality of Offensive Lethal Autonomy, in IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY OF WAR 65 
(David Saxon ed., 2013); Markus Wagner, Autonomy in the Battlespace: Independently Operating 
Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, in id. at 99; Hin-Yan Liu, Categorization and Le-
gality of Autonomous and Remote Weapons Systems, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 627 (2012). Cf. Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Auton-
omous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY 
JOURNAL 231 (2013) (warning against analysis based on unfounded assumptions). 
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demic debates that have recently taken place: one on the power to kill or 
capture and another on the legality of incapacitating chemical agents.  
It concludes with the finding that nanotechnology challenges a funda-
mental assumption that reducing civilian casulaties makes warfare more 
“humane,” which has long supported—and sometimes hindered—the de-
velopment of the principles and rules of weapons law, while highlighting 
practical considerations that have the potential to lead to the creation of 
new principles and rules. 
 
II. NANOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW OF WEAPONRY 
 
Any military application of new technologies is subject to the well-
established principle under the law of armed conflict that “[i]n any armed 
conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means 
of warfare is not unlimited.”13 This principle is further elaborated through 
various rules of weapons law with express restrictions on the choice of 
weapons (means of warfare), which is the focus of this article, as well as on 
the way in which weapons are employed (methods of warfare).14 The way 
in which the choice of weapons or means of warfare is restricted is two-
fold: the general, principle-based approach and the more specific, rule-
based approach. The general principles of weapons law prohibit: 
 
                                                                                                                      
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 35(1), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. See also Regulations Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539, reprinted in 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 73 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 
2000) [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. Judge Weeramantry elaborated on the multicultural 
traditions underpinning limitations to the conduct of warfare in his dissenting opinion in 
the Legality of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nucle-
ar Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 478–82 (Weeramantry, J. dissenting) (July 8) [hereinafter Le-
gality of Nuclear Weapons]. 
14. See generally International Committee of the Red Cross, A Guide to Legal Review of 
New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 931, 937 (2006); TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE 142 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). 
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 the employment of “weapons, projectiles and material and 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury” or 
“calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”;15  
 the use of weapons that indiscriminately affect both lawful tar-
gets and civilians;16 and  
 the employment of “methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment.”17  
 
In addition, States have agreed in a variety of international treaties to 
specific and express prohibitions of weapons, including the employment of 
projectiles of a weight below 400 grammes that are explosive or charged 
with fulminating or inflammable substances;18 expanding bullets;19 asphyxi-
ating, poisonous or other gases;20 biological weapons;21 chemical weapons;22 
                                                                                                                      
15. Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 
23(e), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Hague Regulations, supra note 13, art. 
23(e). Although the authentic French text remained the same (maux superflus), the identical 
phrase in the two instruments was translated differently. For the English translation of the 
treaty texts, see JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS 
OF 1899 AND 1907 116 (1915). Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I placed those two 
expressions side by side. See also 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70 (2005). 
16. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51(4); HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, 
supra note 15, r. 71. 
17. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 35(3). 
18. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 Martens Nou-
veau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 13, at 
54 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration]. 
19. Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 
459, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 1002, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF 
WAR, supra note 13, at 64. 
20. Declaration (IV, 2) on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion 
of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 453, 26 Martens 
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 
13, at 60; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 13, at 158.   
21. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 
1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, reprinted in 11 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 309 [herein-
after BWC]. 
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blinding laser weapons;23 anti-personnel mines;24 and, most recently, cluster 
munitions.25  
Of the three general principles, chiefly relevant to the legal considera-
tion of nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced weapons is the principle 
prohibiting superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. As William Booth-
by succinctly notes, in determining the legality of a weapon with nanotech-
nological components, “[t]he focus will be on whether the fact that certain 
components are based on nanotechnology makes a significant difference to 
the wounding or injuring effect of the weapon or to the suffering its de-
signed use is going to occasion.”26 Yet, as discussed elsewhere, the inde-
terminacy and controversy over the interpretation of this principle poses 
significant challenges to its application for the purpose of assessing the le-
gality of specific nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced weapons.27  
The unique ability provided by nanotechnology to design and manipu-
late molecules with specific properties at the nanoscale level will, at least in 
the foreseeable future, be principally directed at miniaturizing weapons and 
weapons platforms; enhancing the accuracy and manipulability of precision 
attacks; and providing greater force protection. The focus on these pro-
grams results from the fact that weapons development in technologically 
developed countries is prioritized in response to the immediate needs of 
their military forces in existing or anticipated theaters of operation. Ac-
cordingly, the possibility of nanotechnology raising an issue with the prin-
ciple prohibiting indiscriminate weapons is negligible.28 Rather, nanotech-
nology will be found attractive in enabling existing weapons to be more 
discriminate by allowing mechanical precision and manipulation of attacks 
(for example, with miniaturized unmanned aerial vehicles or self-guiding 
                                                                                                                      
22. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, 
reprinted in 32 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 800 [hereinafter CWC]. 
23. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370, reprinted 
in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 13, at 535. 
24. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.  
25. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39. 
26. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, CONFLICT LAW: THE INFLUENCE OF NEW WEAPONS 
TECHNOLOGY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMERGING ACTORS 183 (2014). 
27. For a detailed analysis by the author, see Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 34. 
28. An exception is the use of nano-energetic composites to enhance the power of 
blast weapons. For the author’s analysis of the legal implications, see Nasu, Nanotechnology 
and the Law of Armed Conflict, supra note 5, at 146–49.    
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bullets with nanotechnology-enhanced sensors) or more focused applica-
tion of force (demonstrated by, for instance, the solid-state laser weapon 
system in comparison to other types of directed energy weapons, such as 
the Active Denial System). 29  The third general principle—prohibiting 
weapons which are intended, or may be expected, to cause “widespread, 
long-term and severe damage” to the natural environment—is relevant to 
the extent that engineered nanoparticles may be found to have toxic ef-
fects. However, there is great uncertainty whether the dispersion of toxic 
engineered nanoparticles will ever satisfy the evidentiary standards neces-
sary to establish they have caused widespread, long-term and severe dam-
age.30      
On the other hand, nanotechnology, if used to develop weapons that 
are specifically prohibited or restricted, would be subject to the relevant 
weapons treaty. These treaties prohibit particular weapons or restrict their 
use by reference to the weapon’s construction and characteristics, unlike 
the weapons law principles, which tend to refer to the effects produced by 
the use of weapons.31 The definition of the prohibited weapon under these 
treaties tends to be so specific that any application of nanotechnology that 
does not meet that particular design intent will not be covered. For exam-
ple, the solid-state laser weapon system is not prohibited under the 1995 
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, as it is not “specifically designed, as 
[its] sole combat function or as one of [its] combat functions, to cause 
                                                                                                                      
29. The Active Defense System uses millimeter waves to “zap” the surface of the skin 
producing intense pain without actual injury. Colin Campbell, Raytheon Non-Lethal Heat 
Beam Tackles New Missions, BREAKING DEFENSE (Nov. 5, 2013), http://breakingdefen 
se.com/2013/11/raytheon-non-lethal-heat-beam-tackles-new-missions/. For legal issues 
concerning directed energy weapons, see, e.g., Backstrom & Henderson, supra note 11, at 
499–502; Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, “Bloodless Weapons”? The Need to Conduct 
Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications of Defining Them as “Weapons,” 66 AIR 
FORCE LAW REVIEW 157, 177–79 (2010); Louise Doswald-Beck & Gérald C. Cauderay, 
The Development of New Anti-Personnel Weapons, 30 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 565, 573–74 (1990).  
30. For details, see Nasu, Nanotechnology and Challenges to International Humanitarian Law, 
supra note 5, at 663–65. 
31. Christopher Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New Millennium, in 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM 185, 192 (Michael N. 
Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1999) (Vol. 71, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STUDIES). 
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permanent blindness to unenhanced vision”32 even if it were to have an 
effect of causing blindness.33 
By contrast, under treaties that prohibit and restrict the use of an entire 
class of weapons, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the treaty language is broad 
enough to encompass and prohibit technological advances. For example, 
the scope of the BWC, which was adopted with the objective of “ex-
clud[ing] completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and 
toxins being used as weapons,”34 extends to cover a wide variety of applica-
tions of nanotechnology producing or enhancing toxic effects, as these are 
likely to come within the notion of “[m]icrobial or other biological agents, 
or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes.”35 Pinson argues that the Convention deals only with 
biological organisms or living products and therefore does not extend to 
the artificially or synthetically engineered products that nanotechnology 
would produce.36 However, such a restrictive interpretation would be diffi-
cult to maintain. First, the distinction between nanotechnology and biolog-
ical elements of biotechnology is artificial. High-profile accomplishments in 
synthetic biotechnology pose scenarios for possible construction of de novo 
biological agents without relying on naturally occurring pathogens.37 Sec-
ond, in addition to microbial and biological agents, Article I of the BWC 
                                                                                                                      
32. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 23, art. 1. 
33. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 210–11 
(2009). Compare, however, with the legality of dense inert metal explosives under the 1980 
Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, as discussed in 
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 33–34.  
34. BWC, supra note 21, pmbl. para. 9. Strictly speaking, the Convention does not ex-
plicitly prohibit the “use” of biological weapons, but the 1996 Fourth Review Conference 
confirmed that Article 1 effectively prohibits use. Fourth Review Conference of the Par-
ties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Nov. 
25–Dec. 6, 1996, Geneva, Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference, para. 3 (1996), 
available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/Fourth_Review.shtml.  
35. BWC, supra note 21, art. I. 
36. Robert D. Pinson, Is Nanotechnology Prohibited by the Biological and Chemical Weapons 
Convention?, 22 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 279, 298 (2004). 
37. For details, see, e.g., Gautam Mukunda, Kenneth A. Oye & Scott C. Mohr, What 
Rough Beast? Synthetic Biology, Uncertainty, and the Future of Biosecurity, 28 POLITICS AND THE 
LIFE SCIENCES 2 (2009); MARKUS SCHMIDT ET AL., SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: THE TECHNO-
SCIENCE AND ITS SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES (2009). 
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makes an explicit reference to “toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production.” The travaux préparatoires show that Sweden sought to define 
toxins widely to cover all toxins of both biological and synthetic origin.38 It 
was in this context that Sweden proposed a broad definition of toxins 
(which was adopted in the final text) to ensure that there would remain no 
loophole undermining the purpose of the Convention.39 This broad defini-
tion was also confirmed in the Final Declaration of the Second Review 
Conference.40 Even after the adoption of the CWC in 1993, the broad def-
inition of toxins suggests there is no gap between the two Conventions 
such that no production of toxic substances through the application of 
nanotechnology would be unregulated.  
This does not mean that any application of nanotechnology that pro-
duces or enhances toxic effects would be automatically prohibited under 
the BWC. The Convention only prohibits biological agents or toxins “of 
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protec-
tive or other peaceful purposes,”41 while leaving what exactly constitutes 
“peaceful purposes” indeterminate.42 In other words, the use of nanotech-
nology to develop or produce biological agents or toxins is not prohibited 
if it can be justified as being used for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes. Likewise, the development of nanotechnology-assisted 
equipment or methods of delivery, such as encapsulation, is also lawful un-
less it is used for hostile purposes or in an armed conflict. The significance 
                                                                                                                      
38 . Sweden, Working Paper on Some Aspects of the Definition of Toxins, U.N. Doc. 
CCD/333 (July 6, 1971), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION 
SUPPLEMENT FOR 1971, at 46–47 (1973).  
39. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Feb. 23, 1971–Sept. 30, 1971, Re-
port of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, ¶¶ 49–50, U.N. Doc. DC/234 (Oct. 6, 
1971), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION SUPPLEMENT FOR 
1971, at 5 (1973).  
40. Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on their Destruction, Sept. 8–26, 1986, Geneva, Final Declaration art. I, Doc. 
BWC/CONF.II/13/II (Sep. 26, 1986) (reaffirming “that the Convention unequivocally 
applies to all natural or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins 
whatever their origin or method of production”). See also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZA-
TION, PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS: WHO 
GUIDANCE Annex 2: Toxins, at 214–15 (2004). 
41. BWC, supra note 21, art. I.  
42. See Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case 
of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 
(2007). 
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of the exceptions is reinforced by Article X of the BWC, which recognizes 
the rights of the contracting parties to pursue the development and applica-
tion of scientific discoveries and the exchange of equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.    
Using nanotechnology to develop new chemical agents (whether their 
toxicity is proven or not), or to modify and enhance existing ones,43 will 
more clearly fall within the purview of the CWC. The CWC aims to com-
prehensively ban all uses, development, production, acquisition, stockpil-
ing, and transfer of “toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where 
intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the 
types and quantities are consistent with such purposes”; “munitions and 
devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the tox-
ic properties”; and “any equipment specifically designed for use directly in 
connection with the employment of [such] munitions and devices.”44 The 
Convention defines “toxic chemicals” as “any chemical[s] which through 
[their] chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary inca-
pacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals . . . regardless of their 
origin or of their method of production,” and “precursors” as “any chemi-
cal reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever 
method of a toxic chemical.”45 To assist in applying verification measures, 
specific toxic chemicals and precursors are listed in the schedules annexed 
to the Convention, but the Convention prohibits all substances that come 
within its comprehensive definition of toxic chemicals regardless of wheth-
er they are listed in the schedules or not.46 Like the BWC, however, the 
prohibition of toxic chemicals and their precursors under the CWC is not 
absolute, allowing chemicals used for “purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention”—namely, peaceful purposes (such as industrial, agricultural, 
                                                                                                                      
43. Ralf Trapp, Advances in Science and Technology and the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.armscontrol org/act/2008_ 
03/Trapp. 
44. CWC, supra note 22, art. II(1). 
45. Id., arts. II(2), II(3). 
46. Walter Krutzsch & Ralf Trapp, Article II: Definitions and Criteria, in THE CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 73, 77 (Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer & Ralf 
Trapp eds., 2014). The delegates to Second Review Conference of the CWC States Parties, 
held in 2008, also considered that the existing Convention definitions were adequate to 
cover developments in science and technology in the application of the Convention to 
toxic chemicals. Conference of the States Parties, Apr. 7–18, 2008, Report of the Second Spe-
cial Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (Second Review Conference), ¶ 9.22, Doc. RC-2/4 (Apr. 18, 2008). 
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research, medical, pharmaceutical), protective purposes, military purposes 
not connected with their use as a method of warfare, and law enforcement 
purposes.47 Thus, nanotechnology-enabled chemical agents are not consid-
ered to be chemical weapons unless they are deployed with the intention to 
utilize the toxicity of those chemical agents.48  
It is thus clear that there is no legal gap or loophole that can be exploit-
ed with the use of nanotechnology to disguise a violation of weapons law 
principles or rules. These principles and rules are either broad enough to 
address technological advances (albeit with a degree of indeterminacy) or 
specific enough to exclude nanotechnology developed weapons that are 
prohibited by weapons treaties. However, the adequacy of the existing 
principles and rules of weapons law still needs to be reviewed in light of the 
specific characteristics of nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced weapons 
or weapon systems and their transformative impact on the means and 
methods of warfare employed in the future battlespace. 
 
III. WEAPONS LAW PARADOX 
 
A frequent criticism is that law continues to lag behind technological ad-
vancement, treaties prohibiting or restricting specific technological devel-
opments tending to be reactive and defined restrictively with technical pre-
cision.49 This is because the adoption of such treaties necessarily depends 
on multiple variables including—but by no means limited to—strategic 
considerations, military necessity, political interests and costs associated 
with weapons development, as well as a catalytic event that rapidly escalates 
public stigmatization of a particular weapons technology.50 Negotiations for 
regulating specific technological developments pose particular challenges as 
it is difficult to fully appreciate the transformative impacts of weapons 
                                                                                                                      
47. CWC, supra note 22, art. II(9). 
48. See Krutzsch & Trapp, supra note 46, at 75 (even with toxic side effects when such 
weapons are used). 
49. Timothy L.H. McCormack, A Non Liquet on Nuclear Weapons—The ICJ Avoids the 
Application of General Principles of International Humanitarian Law, 316 INTERNATIONAL RE-
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 76, 90 (1997). 
50. Robert McLaughlin & Hitoshi Nasu, Introduction: Conundrum of New Technologies in 
the Law of Armed Conflict, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 
supra note 5, at 1, 12–13. In recent years, civil society has increased its influence on the 
development of weapon treaties. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Ottawa Convention Banning 
Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International 
Civil Society, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (2000). 
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technology and the full implications of its regulation in the future bat-
tlespace. 
As a result of balancing competing interests during diplomatic negotia-
tions, drafting a weapons treaty tends to become arbitrary line-drawing and 
one that lacks coherent, principle-based reasoning.51 For example, explo-
sive projectiles prohibited under the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration were 
limited to those weighing under 400 grammes, a more or less arbitrary dis-
tinction, reflecting the dividing line discernible at that time between explo-
sive artillery and rifle munitions, only the latter being considered dispensa-
ble in terms of their military utility.52  
An example of where technology has altered the manner in which 
weapons may be employed is that of flattening or expanding bullets, whose 
use against enemy forces during armed conflict is prohibited under the 
1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets.53 These rounds 
have been radically refined with technological advancement, to the point 
that they have become a preferred munition for policing because they have 
better immediate stopping power than full-metal-jacketed rounds and tend 
to stay in the body of the target rather than passing through and creating 
risk to bystanders.54 A similar situation may soon arise with regard to bio-
logical and chemical weapons, with nanotechnology enabling a targeted 
delivery of biochemical agents without a risk of uncontrolled dispersal. 
These weapons (as will be discussed further below in relation to incapaci-
tating chemical agents) may become a preferred means of disabling the tar-
get in law enforcement operations, while their use during armed combat 
would remain prohibited.  
                                                                                                                      
51. See BOOTHBY, supra note 33, at 60. 
52. Frits Kalshoven, Arms, Armaments and International Law, 191 RECUEIL DES COURS 
185, 207–8 (1985-II). Later, light explosive or incendiary projectiles weighing less than 
400 g were developed and have been widely accepted unless they are used against persons. 
See id. at 223. 
53. Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, supra note 19. Note, however, 
that the customary international law status of this prohibition is disputed. See OFFICE OF 
THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL 
§ 6.5.4.4 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. 
54. Kenneth Watkin, Chemical Agents and “Expanding” Bullets: Limited Law Enforcement 
Exceptions and Unwarranted Handcuffs?, in THE LAW OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra 
note 8, at 193, 199; Robert McLaughlin, Unmanned Naval Vehicles and the Law of Naval War-
fare, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 229, 
237. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2015 
500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To the extent that weapons treaties are considered to be a particular 
manifestation of the general principles of weapons law, such as the prohibi-
tion of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and the prohibition of 
indiscriminate weapons, technological advances, combined with the chang-
ing nature of hostilities, may create a disjuncture between the original ra-
tionale underpinning the weapons treaty and the general principles of 
weapons law. This may happen, for example, due to the increased military 
necessity of a particular weapon prohibited under the treaty (as is the case 
with flattening and expanding bullets) or the development of technology 
that enables a weapon prohibited as inherently indiscriminate to be more 
discriminately targetable (as is arguably the case with nanotechnology-
enabled targeted delivery of biochemical agents). With further exploitation 
of the unique ability provided by nanotechnology to miniaturize weapons 
and weapons platforms, enhance accuracy and manipulability of precision 
attacks, and provide a greater range of focused force application, this dis-
juncture may loom larger, generating a “weapons law paradox.” This para-
dox leaves weapons that are intrinsically illegal under the general principles 
unregulated,55 while weapons that are not considered as conflicting with the 
general principles are found to be regulated by a specific weapons treaty. 
The dynamics that cause this paradox can be better understood when 
the weapons law principles are dissected into the constitutive elements— 
military necessity and humanity—that underpin many of the existing rules 
of the law of armed conflict, including those concerning weaponry.56 These 
elements are not fixed, but are subject to change over the course of years 
and centuries as technology evolves and the nature of warfare changes. 
Thus, at the dawn of twentieth century the use of flattening and expanding 
rounds was viewed as causing unnecessary suffering, even in light of the 
military necessity of stopping advancing soldiers who continued to fight 
                                                                                                                      
55. For such arguments, see, e.g., EITAN BARAK, DEADLY METAL RAIN: THE LEGAL-
ITY OF FLECHETTE WEAPONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 179–202 (2011); Jason A. Beckett, 
Interim Legality: A Mistaken Assumption?—An Analysis of Depleted Uranium Munitions under 
Contemporary International Humanitarian Law, 3 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
43 (2004); Owen Thomas Gibbons, Uses and Effects of Depleted Uranium Munitions: Towards a 
Moratorium on Use, 7 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 191, 206–24 
(2004). 
56. See especially Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Hu-
manitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 795 (2010).  
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after suffering an injury from a single completely jacketed rifle bullet.57 To-
day military necessity arguably demands the use of such bullets, for exam-
ple, in a counterterrorism operation in a densely populated area or on 
board a civilian aircraft to minimize the risk of collateral damage inflicted 
upon innocent bystanders.58 A similar observation can be made when, for 
example nanotechnology contributes to the development of an anti-
personnel explosive munition that is designed to explode inside the human 
body or detonate on impact with human tissue causing damage within only 
a defined parameter, which would significantly reduce the risk of civilian 
casualties in the vicinity of a lawful target, even in a densely populated area. 
It has been widely affirmed that the anti-personnel munition that is de-
signed to explode within the human body or detonate on impact with the 
human tissue is prohibited as causing superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering under customary international law.59 Could these changes of cir-
cumstances, including those facilitated by military applications of nano-
technology, disturb the equilibrium that underpinned the ban on these 
weapons as a clear manifestation of the superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering principle and render the St. Petersburg Declaration completely 
obsolete? 
Before reaching any conclusion on this question, it must be acknowl-
edged that the notion of humanity may also evolve as the technology af-
fects the way in which wars can be fought and also, arguably, as the societal 
                                                                                                                      
57. See JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFER-
ENCES: THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 276–78 (1920) (Remarks by General Sir John 
Ardagh). See also Frits Kalshoven, The Soldier and His Golf Clubs, in ETUDES ET ESSAYS SUR 
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIX-ROUGE, 
EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN PICTET 369, 374–76 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984). 
58. Remarks reportedly made by Christopher Greenwood in his keynote address, 
“Legal Aspects of Current Regulations,” Third International Workshop on Wound Ballis-
tics, Thun, Switzerland, March 28–29, 2001, cited in W. Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons 
and Weapons Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 55, 89–90 
(2005). See also Steven Haines, Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 258, 272 (Eliz-
abeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2005); George. H. Aldrich, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law—An Interpretation on Behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 503, 520 (2006).  
59. See especially HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 15, r. 78; BOOTHBY, su-
pra note 33, at 142–43. Cf. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 53, § 6.5.4.3.  
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perception of acceptable human suffering changes.60 The notion of human-
ity in the general context of the law of armed conflict is primarily—at least 
as it currently stands—understood by reference to the protection of civil-
ians, as found in rules such as the prohibition of indiscriminate weapons, as 
well as in the related principles of discrimination, proportionality and the 
duty to exercise precautions in targeting (what I will refer to as the first 
thesis of humanity). This notion of humanity in warfare is not new. The 
1863 Lieber Code reads: 
 
As civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise 
steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the 
private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country 
itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more 
acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, proper-
ty, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.61 
 
It is this meaning of humanity that is used as an underlying logic in the 
scenarios introduced above to drive a potential shifting of the balance, not 
against military necessity, but in reinforcing the military necessity of em-
ploying weapons that would otherwise be considered prohibited as causing 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. What, then, is the element of 
humanity that is actually sacrificed in this trade-off?   
Unlike the prohibition on indiscriminate weapons, which aims to pro-
tect civilians from attack, the superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering 
principle applies regardless of the legal status of the person upon which the 
injury or suffering is inflicted. Indeed, the notion of humanity in this sense 
is articulated in the St. Petersburg Declaration which states in its preamble 
that “the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of 
disabled man, or render their death inevitable . . . would, therefore, be con-
trary to the laws of humanity.”62 This principle, as reaffirmed by the Inter-
national Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use by a 
                                                                                                                      
60. For the military ethics debate on this point, see, e.g., PAULINE M. KAURIN, THE 
WARRIOR, MILITARY ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE: ACHILLES GOES ASYM-
METRICAL (2014). 
61. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field art. 22, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 6 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 2004).  
62. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 18. 
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State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,63 provides the cardinal legal pro-
tection (and a few particular manifestations of it under specific treaties) 
accorded to combatants and others who may be lawfully targeted in terms 
of the means of warfare that may be legitimately employed against them 
(what I will refer to as the second thesis of humanity). It is this second the-
sis of humanity that is sacrificed in the trade-off in the scenarios described 
above, i.e., the element of humanity which concerns the protection of 
combatants and other lawful targets from superfluous injury or unneces-
sary suffering and, arguably, inevitable death, rather than the first thesis of 
humanity, which provides that the “unarmed citizen is to be spared.” Alt-
hough this second thesis of humanity is not to be sacrificed under the cur-
rent understanding and application of the principle of humanity, this cus-
tomary international law rule may undergo reformation if it can be shown 
that military necessity derives, for example, from an anti-personnel explo-
sive munition designed to cause damage within only a defined parameter, 
and if State practice demonstrates over time that the superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering principle is not interpreted as prohibiting such a mu-
nition.64 
 
IV. THE POTENTIAL OF NANOTECHNOLOGY TO BRING CHANGE TO 
THE LAW OF WEAPONRY 
 
At the advent of an era in which nanotechnology enables the development 
and enhancement of focused force application capabilities that can reduce 
the risk of civilian casualties, it is likely that tension will arise between the 
two theses of humanity, rather than between a single, fixed notion of hu-
manity and military necessity. While achieving a greater level of precision 
and certainty of lethality against lawful targets could reduce civilian casual-
ties and make warfare more “humane,” it may at the same time prompt us 
to revisit the second thesis of humanity—that limits the degree of injury or 
suffering that can be inflicted upon lawful targets—and re-examine its role 
in applying and developing the law of weaponry in the context of future 
warfare. 
                                                                                                                      
63. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 13, ¶¶ 77–78 (“[I]t is prohibited to cause un-
necessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing 
them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering.”). 
64. The author is particularly grateful to Dr. Boothby for his comments in the devel-
opment of this argument.  
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With a focus on applications of nanotechnology that enable scientists 
to produce mechanically controllable precision munitions capable of limit-
ing the impact of the attack to a defined parameter to reduce or completely 
eliminate the risk of civilian casualties, this Part considers how the second 
thesis of humanity may evolve with respect to restrictions on the degree of 
injury or suffering inflicted upon lawful targets. It does so by contextualiz-
ing this question in terms of two academic debates that have recently taken 
place on the power to kill or capture and the legality of incapacitating 
chemical agents. 
 
A. The Power to Kill or Capture Debate 
 
One of the recent debates where the second thesis of humanity may be-
come of relevance is the argument, which appears in Part IX of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,65 
that attempts to justify greater restrictions upon the means and methods of 
warfare employed against lawful targets. Most relevantly, the Interpretive 
Guidance suggests “considerations of humanity require that, within the pa-
rameters set by the specific provisions of IHL [international humanitarian 
law], no more death, injury, or destruction be caused than is actually neces-
sary for the accomplishment of a legitimate military purpose in the prevail-
ing circumstances.”66  
Written in the context of direct participation in hostilities by civilians, 
this statement clearly aims to extend the superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering requirement beyond its original remit of weapons law into a 
broader legal context, while acknowledging that considerations of humanity 
play a role only within the parameters set by the specific provisions of the 
law of armed conflict. However, Nils Melzer, who was primarily responsi-
ble for the drafting of the Interpretive Guidance, appears to take the argument 
a step further without articulating the restrictive role of the considerations 
of humanity when he states that “the restrictive aspect of the principle of 
military necessity requires that there be no reasonable alternative while in-
                                                                                                                      
65. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE], available at https:// 
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. 
66. Id. at 80. 
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terfering significantly less with humanitarian or other values, which IHL 
aims to protect from the effects of the hostilities.”67     
The problems and flaws in these arguments, extensively and convinc-
ingly discussed by Hays Parks,68 need not be repeated here. However, one 
of the most relevant grounds of his critique for the purpose of the present 
discussion is succinctly expressed as follows: 
 
Other than general or specific limitations on conventional weapons, such 
as those contained in the protocols to the 1980 Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, nations otherwise have written law of war trea-
ties to protect war victims while prudently declining to impose treaty re-
strictions on decisions by battlefield commanders or individual soldiers 
with respect to application of force against enemy combatants or civilians 
taking a direct part in hostilities. The ICRC’s effort to the contrary with 
reference to general principles such as humanity, military necessity, and propor-
tionality is devoid of any reference to treaty provisions, or State practice, 
instead attempting an approach governments have assiduously avoided.69  
 
A more narrowly-defined and specific rule-based power to kill or cap-
ture debate has taken place between Ryan Goodman and Michael 
Schmitt.70 Goodman’s central thesis focuses on the circumstances in which 
an individual is considered hors de combat, in particular, whether combatants 
who no longer have the means to defend themselves, but who are not in-
jured, sick or surrendering, are indeed protected from direct attack as hors 
de combat.71 Yet, more relevant to the present discussion is his attempt to 
find a broader, theoretical support for his “least-restrictive-means” analysis 
in the superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering principle regulating the 
                                                                                                                      
67. NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293–94 (2008). 
68. W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Man-
date, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 769, 796–827 (2010). 
69. Id. at 806 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
70 . Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 819 (2013); Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or 
Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s “The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants,” 24 EUROPE-
AN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 855 (2013); Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or 
Capture Enemy Combatants: A Rejoinder to Michael N. Schmitt, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 863 (2013). 
71. Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, supra note 70, at 830–36. 
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means and methods of warfare States can employ.72 Relying on this weap-
ons law principle, Goodman develops the following analysis: 
 
States do not, however, retain the prerogative to use the weapon when 
there is clearly no military benefit. It is in this sense that the prohibition 
on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering operates. That is, either 
as a result of a general principle of necessity or as a more specific prohibi-
tion on unnecessary suffering. LOAC [law of armed conflict] forbids the 
use of methods and means of combat that are neither able nor intended 
to achieve a military benefit.73 
 
Assuming that by “a general principle of necessity”74 he means military ne-
cessity, then reliance on it would invite the same criticism that has been 
made against the Interpretive Guidance by Parks. The notions of military ne-
cessity and humanity are both embedded in the specific rules of the law of 
armed conflict and do not exist as independent prescriptive norms that can 
be invoked to derogate from specific rules of the law of armed conflict or 
to restrain belligerents’ freedom of conduct.75 As Schmitt remarks in his 
critique of Goodman’s thesis, “every IHL rule represents an attempt by 
States to craft a fair balance between the need to be effective in battle and 
the desire to humanize it. . . . [I]t is not in itself a separate prescriptive 
norm with independent valence.”76    
With regard to the second ground of Goodman’s argument, that a par-
ticular use of a weapon may be prohibited “as a more specific prohibition 
on unnecessary suffering,” the application of the superfluous injury or unnec-
essary suffering principle to methods of warfare should be approached 
with caution. While Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I refers not only to 
weapons but also to methods of warfare, its application is subject to the 
same interpretive tests as those that apply to weapons; namely, whether, by 
reference either to the design intent or the effects of normal or expected 
                                                                                                                      
72. Id. at 836–37. 
73. Id. at 837 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
74. An alternative understanding is necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongful-
ness in the sense of State responsibility for a breach of obligations under the law of armed 
conflict; however, this does not make sense as “a general principle of necessity” is used to 
restrict the freedom of State action.   
75. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1389 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987). 
76. Schmitt, supra note 70, at 857. 
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use, the method is of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering,77 and whether a balance exists between the degree of injury or 
suffering inflicted and the degree of military necessity underlying the choice 
of a particular method of warfare.78 With the exception of specifically pro-
hibited methods of warfare such as no quarter and starvation,79 this balance 
cannot be generalized or clarified without an insight into the actual situa-
tion in which the method is employed.80  
A clear trend that emerges from this brief analysis of the power to kill 
or capture debate is that attempts are consistently made to find a legal basis 
for restricting the conduct of warfare under the notion of military necessi-
ty, giving little consideration to the humanitarian impact of technological 
advances in weaponry. By restricting the application of the debate to situa-
tions where armed forces operate against selected individuals under their 
control,81 the proponents of the power to capture side of the debate at-
tempt to remove the first thesis of humanity from the equation. But in do-
ing so, they fail to articulate the countervailing humanitarian factor to mili-
tary necessity—the humanitarian considerations that render the use of a 
particular means or method of warfare unnecessary, when compared to the 
alternatives, to achieve the same military objective. Is it the circumstances 
in which the lawful target is deprived of his or her life, or is it the particular 
form of means or method of warfare—such as armed unmanned aerial ve-
hicles (generally known as “drones”)—that allegedly renders a killing un-
necessary or inhumane? 
Assuming it is the circumstances in which the lawful target is deprived 
of his or her life which the proponents are concerned about, given the re-
stricted scope of their argument, its internal logic starts to collapse as the 
circumstances change when an alternative method is employed. For exam-
                                                                                                                      
77. See, e.g., James D. Fry, Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of War-
fare: Cave Combat and International Humanitarian Law, 44 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL LAW 453, 470–71 (2006); Parks, supra note 68, at 76–82.  
78. Government experts attending at the Conference on the Use of Certain Conven-
tional Weapons in Lucerne in 1974 were in general agreement on this point. See INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERN-
MENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ¶¶ 23–24 (1975). 
See also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 75, ¶ 1428. 
79. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. 40 and 54(1), respectively. 
80. See Kalshoven, supra note 52, at 234–35; Greenwood, supra note 31, at 195–99. 
Note, however, their observations are made in relation to weapons. 
81. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 80–81; Goodman, The Power to Kill or 
Capture Enemy Combatants, supra note 70, at 826–28.  
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ple, the Interpretive Guidance refers to a situation where a lawful target is sit-
ting in a restaurant located within an area firmly controlled by the opposing 
party, suggesting that this lawful target should be neutralized through cap-
ture or other non-lethal means.82 Drawing on this proposition, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions also 
argues that “rather than using drone strikes, U.S. forces should, wherever 
and whenever possible, conduct arrests, or use less-than-lethal force to re-
strain.”83 However, as soon as an alternative method is employed, for ex-
ample, using a special forces unit to capture the person, he or she may 
move into an area heavily populated by civilians or may be surrounded by 
civilians by the time the unit arrives, resulting in civilian casualties that 
could have been avoided if the target had been engaged instantly using a 
“drone.” Therefore, the proposition that a less-than-lethal means or meth-
od should be employed under certain circumstances is inextricably linked 
with an assessment under the law of targeting in which the first thesis of 
humanity plays a central role. 
Alternatively, the proponents of the power to capture argument may 
contend that it is the particular means and method of warfare adopted to 
neutralize a lawful target, for example, the specific manner in which an 
unmanned aerial vehicle is used to produce a lethal outcome, that is con-
sidered unnecessary or inhumane. The question then comes squarely within 
the scope of weapons law, inquiring whether there is any basis for conclud-
ing that the particular means and method of warfare employed is of an in-
humane nature, such as of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unneces-
sary suffering, and whether it should be prohibited notwithstanding the 
fact that it is the most effective means and method to reduce or eliminate 
the risk of civilian casualties. As nanotechnology contributes to increases in 
the sophistication of the application of force (e.g., through miniaturization 
of unmanned aerial vehicles or self-guiding bullets) and reduces or com-
pletely eliminates the risk of civilian casualties, this will become a more rel-
evant question, with a greater focus on the meaning and impact of the sec-
ond thesis of humanity for weapons regulation. In this respect, the power 
to kill or capture debate can be better seen as one possible future legal ap-
proach to weapons law, heralding a new humanitarian law era in which 
                                                                                                                      
82. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 81. 
83. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on 
Targeted Killings, ¶ 77, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 
(May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ bod-
ies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf. 
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questions concerning “humane” ways to attack lawful targets may be more 
fully explored, rather than as an argument that reflects lex lata.    
 
B. The Legality of Incapacitating Chemical Agents Debate 
 
The tension between the first and second theses of humanity has also aris-
en with respect to the use of incapacitating chemical agents during armed 
conflict. As discussed in Part II, incapacitating agents—whether they are 
made from biological pathogens or have chemical properties—are prohib-
ited from development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention or 
transfer, as well as use as weapons under any circumstances by the BWC 
and the CWC. The use of nanotechnology to produce novel biochemical 
agents does not create a legal loophole in the comprehensive treaty bans. 
The term “never under any circumstances” that commonly appears in the 
BWC and the CWC makes it clear that the use of biological and toxin 
weapons, as well as chemical weapons, is prohibited both in international 
and non-international armed conflict.84 The prohibition is also considered 
to be customary international law.85 However, the application of the rule to 
law enforcement is excluded explicitly under the CWC, and, arguably, un-
der the BWC as one of “peaceful purposes.”86 These exceptions to the 
prohibitions may have increasingly wider implications given the expansive 
nature of modern military operations, particularly in law enforcement-type 
situations and the lower end of intensity of non-international armed con-
flicts.87  
Indeed, a greater utility has recently been advocated for riot control 
agents (RCAs) as a method of undertaking counterterrorism operations,88 
and the United States has long maintained a policy of using RCAs in defen-
sive military modes, in circumstances that can be interpreted as wider than 
domestic law enforcement purposes. 89  On October 26, 2002, Russian 
                                                                                                                      
84. See BOOTHBY, supra note 33, at 319, 321; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 
53, § 6.8. 
85. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 15, at 256, 260. 
86. See Michael Crowley, The Use of Incapacitants in Law Enforcement, in WEAPONS UN-
DER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 357, 379–80 (Stuart Casey-Maslen ed., 2014). 
87. See Watkin, supra note 54, at 196–97. 
88. J.P. Perry Robinson, Difficulties Facing the Chemical Weapons Convention, 84 INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS 223, 228–29 (2008). 
89. BOOTHBY, supra note 33, at 135; David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Cus-
tomary International Humanitarian Law, 11 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 201, 
224 (2006). 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2015 
510 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spetsnaz Forces deployed a chemical agent—the powerful, fast-acting opiate 
Fentanyl—in a Moscow theater through its ventilation system in order to 
liberate 634 hostages taken by Chechen separatists.90 This occurred argua-
bly in the wider context of a non-international armed conflict between 
Russian forces and Chechen separatists. 91  More recently, concerns have 
been raised about the increased interest among States in the use of incapac-
itating chemical agents in situations where law enforcement operations 
evolve into a non-international armed conflict, or where the State denies 
the existence of an armed conflict. The practice, it is feared, would result in 
a potentially dangerous erosion of the comprehensive ban on chemical 
weapons.92   
RCAs such as CS gas and pepper spray have been the chemical agents 
traditionally used for law enforcement purposes. The CWC defines RCAs 
as “[a]ny chemicals not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in 
humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear 
within a short time following termination of exposure.”93 There is an unre-
solved debate as to whether law enforcement purposes within the meaning 
of the CWC are confined to the use of RCAs or could extend to the use of 
incapacitating chemical agents more broadly.94 Other chemical substanc-
es—including novel toxic chemicals produced by applications of nano-
technology, for example, to enhance temporary physical disabling effects or 
                                                                                                                      
90. Judith Miller & William J. Broad, Hostage Drama in Moscow: The Toxic Agent; U.S. 
Suspects Opiate in Gas in Russia Raid, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/29/world/hostage-drama-in-moscow-the-toxic-agent 
-us-suspects-opiate-in-gas-in-russia-raid.html. 
91. For details, see, e.g., David P. Fidler, The Meaning of Moscow: “Non-Lethal” Weapons 
and International Law in the 21st Century, 859 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 
525 (2005). 
92. See Press Release, International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Calls on 
States to Prevent the Development of Toxic Chemicals as Weapons (Feb. 6, 2013), availa-
ble at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2013/02-06-toxic-c 
hemicals-weapons.htm; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION, WEAPONS OF 
TERROR: FREEING THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS 132 
(June 1, 2006), available at http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/assets/downloads/weapons_of_terr 
or.pdf. 
93. CWC, supra note 22, art. II(7). 
94. See Krutzsch & Trapp, supra note 46, at 94–101; Crowley, supra note 86, at 375–78; 
Mirko Sossai, Drugs as Weapons: Disarmament Treaties Facing the Advances in Biochemistry and 
Non-Lethal Weapons Technology, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 5, 21–22 
(2010); Julian Perry Robinson, The Negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Histori-
cal Overview, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION AND 
PROSPECTS 17, 31 (Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti & Allan Rosas eds., 1998). 
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to tailor the nature or severity of the incapacitating effects to a particular 
objective desired by the user95—and their precursors could theoretically be 
considered lawful if developed or used for law enforcement purposes, but 
not if those substances are used as a means of warfare, or their types or 
quantities produced are not consistent with their use for law enforcement 
purposes.96 Yet, the fundamental distinction between means of warfare and 
law enforcement should inform the design purpose if a new chemical agent 
is to be developed for law enforcement purposes alone. Thus, if lethality or 
permanent harm is the primary characteristic of a novel nano-chemical 
agent, the presumption is that such a substance cannot be considered as 
being developed or produced for law enforcement purposes.97 
The central issue for the purpose of the present analysis lies with nano-
technology-enhanced incapacitating chemical agents that are not designed, 
primarily at least, to be lethal or to cause permanent harm, being used for 
hostile purposes in armed conflict. Even though clearly prohibited under 
the CWC, if one attempts to extend the power to kill or capture debate fur-
ther, it would make sense to allow the military to use such weapons in or-
der to disable lawful targets until it becomes practicable to detain them.98 
This would be particularly so when those nanotechnology-enhanced inca-
pacitating chemical agents can be delivered on lawful targets only, for ex-
ample, by using miniaturized unmanned aerial vehicles to inject chemical 
agents via physical contact with the target, shooting directly at the target 
from close range, or by controlling the physical and time parameters in 
which the incapacitating effects of nanotechnology-enhanced chemicals 
may last.  
                                                                                                                      
95. For recent developments on chemical and biological weapons that are not consid-
ered to be weapons of mass destruction, see Robinson, supra note 88, at 237–38. 
96. CWC, supra note 22, art. II(1)(a). 
97. A more challenging question arises when lethality or permanent harm remains a 
potential consequence of using a novel nano-chemical agent primarily designed for a tem-
porary incapacitation. This question is of general relevance to so-called “non-lethal weap-
ons,” which have been criticized for their potential lethality notwithstanding the fact that 
police are routinely issued with firearms in some countries, which are designed to kill or 
cause permanent harm. See generally DAVID A. KOPLOW, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: THE 
LAW AND POLICY OF REVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE MILITARY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (2006). 
98. Concerns may still be raised that incapacitating chemical agents could be used as a 
prelude to the application of lethal force against those identified as targets. However, 
those who are incapacitated as a result would be considered hors de combat. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2015 
512 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The foundational rationale underpinning the comprehensive ban on 
chemical weapons, as it appears in the preamble to the CWC, is the “pro-
hibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,” indi-
cating the shared understanding that chemical weapons are indiscriminate 
in nature.99 Indeed, a report prepared by the UN Secretary-General as the 
basis for possible political and legal action by States with respect to chemi-
cal and bacteriological (biological) weapons expressed concern that techno-
logical advances would allow them to cause casualties on a large scale and 
that their effects were unpredictable.100 This rationale resonates with the 
first thesis of humanity, placing the indiscriminate risk to civilians as the 
central consideration of humanity. If this was the only concern that led the 
States to comprehensively ban chemical weapons under any circumstances, 
there seems to be no legally sound reason to maintain the comprehensive 
ban against the sophistication of delivery methods enabling precision 
strikes of incapacitating chemical agents enhanced by nanotechnology on 
lawful targets.101  
This observation can be further contextualized when the comprehen-
sive ban on chemical weapons is compared with the historical development 
of the ban on asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The idea to prohibit the 
employment of projectiles whose sole purpose is to spread asphyxiating or 
deleterious gases was opened for discussion during the 1899 Hague Con-
ference. Disagreement, although expressed only by the U.S. delegate, 
                                                                                                                      
99. A similar rationale is offered on the prohibition of poison as a weapon in the 
Commentary on Additional Protocol I, which observes that “poison is unlawful in itself, as 
would be any weapon which would, by its very nature, be so imprecise that it would inevi-
tably cause indiscriminate damage.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, 
supra note 75, ¶ 1402. 
100. U.N. Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and 
the Effects of Their Possible Use 1–3, U.N. Doc. A/7575/Rev.1–S/9292/Rev.1 (1969) 
(“The fear today is that the scientific and technological advances of the past few decades 
have increased the potential of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to such 
an extent that one can conceive of their use causing casualties on a scale greater than one 
would associate with conventional warfare. . . . [T]he outstanding characteristics of this 
class of weapons, particularly bacteriological (biological) weapons, is the variability, 
amounting, under some circumstances to unpredictability, of their effects.”). 
101. It should be remembered, however, that, as explained earlier, weapons are not 
always prohibited on rational, legally sound grounds. One may recall that the U.S. pro-
posal to exempt anti-personnel landmines equipped with self-destruction or self-
deactivation features has been rejected in favor of a comprehensive ban. See, e.g., Michael 
Dolan & Chris Hunt, Negotiating in the Ottawa Process: The New Multilateralism, 5(3) CANADI-
AN FOREIGN POLICY JOURNAL 25, 41–45 (1998).   
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stemmed from the basic question as to whether “it is no more cruel to as-
phyxiate one’s enemies by means of deleterious gases than with water, that 
is to say, by drowning them, as happens when a vessel is sunk by the tor-
pedo of a torpedo-boat.”102 Captain Schéine, the Russian delegate, rejected 
this comparison by pointing out that: 
 
Many persons may be saved even if they have been wounded or placed 
out of action, in case a vessel is sunk by a torpedo. Asphyxiating gases, on 
the contrary, would exterminate the whole crew. 
 
This procedure would therefore be contrary to the humane idea which 
ought to guide us, namely, that of finding means of putting enemies out 
of action without putting them out of the world.103 
 
This debate ended with the almost unanimous adoption of the 1899 Hague 
Declaration prohibiting the use of projectiles whose sole purpose was to 
spread asphyxiating or deleterious gases (only the United States object-
ed),104 a rule which was subsequently reaffirmed in Article 23(e) of the 1907 
Hague Regulations.105 Jean Pascal Zanders observes that asphyxiating or 
deleterious gases were seen at that time as a novel weapon and the product 
of scientific advance, whose barbarous, treacherous and cruel nature was 
similar to poison, which had been condemned universally as an ancient and 
barbaric form of warfare.106 Likewise, Frits Kalshoven observes that “the 
overriding argument in favour of a ban on use was their barbaric and un-
necessarily cruel, that is, inhumane character.”107 It is thus clear that the 
primary rationale for the prohibition of asphyxiating or deleterious gases 
concerned the second thesis of humanity according protection to those 
who might lawfully be targeted from certain forms of killing.  
As explained above, the central concern of the parties to the CWC was 
the impact of chemical weapons on civilian lives, rather than with the pro-
tection of combatants from death caused by chemical reaction, as evi-
                                                                                                                      
102. Third meeting of The Hague First Commission, June 22, 1899, in SCOTT, supra 
note 57, at 283 (Remarks of Captain Alfred T. Mahan). 
103. Id. 
104. Declaration (IV, 2) on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffu-
sion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, supra note 20. 
105. Hague Regulations, supra note 13.  
106. Jean Pascal Zanders, International Norms against Chemical and Biological Warfare: An 
Ambiguous Legacy, 8 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 391, 406 (2003). 
107. Kalshoven, supra note 52, at 216. 
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denced by the Convention provisions addressing chemicals that can cause 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals, as well 
as those that can cause death. However, as applications of nanotechnology 
enable precise delivery of incapacitating chemical agents at specific lawful 
targets or greater control of the incapacitating effects of chemical agents, 
the dilemma, which might well have already been recognized, will start to 
become clearer. That is, that it is prohibited to use nanotechnology-
enhanced incapacitating chemical agents delivered by a precision device, 
also enhanced by applications of nanotechnology, while it is not prohibited 
to achieve the same military outcome by using the same device to deliver 
an explosive munition and detonate in close proximity to (e.g., just above 
the head of) the lawful target.108  
Suppose that in both instances the risk of civilian casualties is com-
pletely eliminated. Whether a consensus will then emerge among States for 
an introduction of a new law or a change to the existing law that focuses 
more on the second thesis of humanity would depend upon their balancing 
of the military necessity-humanity equation with respect to the manner in 
which lawful targets can be attacked. How will States interpret the balance 
between military necessity and humanity if nanotechnology enables the de-
velopment of incapacitating chemical agents that can be applied with great 
assurance and precision on chosen lawful targets? Will States insist on 
maintaining the integrity of existing treaty prohibitions on biochemical 
weapons, thus precluding the acquisition of potentially more humane op-
tions than currently exist? These are the questions that will confront States 
and the public conscience as nanotechnology contributes to the sophistica-
tion of the application of force that eliminates (or at least greatly reduces) 
the risk of civilian casualties.          
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As is the case with any new technology, it is expected that nanotechnology 
will change the way in which wars can be fought. For example, nanotech-
nology will enable existing weapons to be more discriminate by allowing 
mechanical precision and manipulation of attacks, as well as more focused 
application of force. The existing weapons law principles and rules are both 
broad enough to address development of weapons enabled or enhanced by 
                                                                                                                      
108. Assuming that detonating the explosive inside the human body or upon impact 
with the human tissue is considered to violate the superfluous injury or unnecessary suf-
fering principle. 
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applications of nanotechnology, and specific enough to exclude them if 
prohibited under the existing weapons treaties. However, as this article has 
discussed, the exploitation of the unique ability provided by nanotechnolo-
gy is likely to produce more cases caught by the “weapons law paradox,” 
the situation that leaves intrinsically illegal weapons under the general prin-
ciples unregulated, while weapons that do not conflict with the general 
principles are found to be regulated by a specific weapons treaty.  
The examination of two recent debates concerning the degree of injury 
or harm inflicted upon lawful targets, namely, the power to kill or capture 
and the legality of incapacitating chemical agents, has revealed that the role 
of the second thesis of humanity as a countervailing factor to military ne-
cessity has not been duly taken into account beyond its manifestation in the 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering principle. As nanotechnology 
contributes to the sophistication in application of force that eliminates (or 
at least greatly reduces) the risk of civilian casualties, it is expected that the 
focus of the debate will shift from what is an acceptable risk to civilian lives 
to what is an acceptable form of disabling lawful targets. The extent to 
which the second thesis of humanity may play a role in shifting the focus 
of this debate for the development of weapons law hinges upon how States 
and the public conscience react to the emergence and widespread deploy-
ment of nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced weapons in the battlespace; 
whether they are merely content with reduction of civilian casualties during 
military operations or whether they shift their attention to the questions 
concerning “humane” ways to disable lawful targets.    
As the history of weapons law development evidences, however, hu-
manitarian concern is not the only motivation for States to negotiate and 
conclude a treaty to prohibit or restrict the use of a particular weapon. As 
Boothby observes,  
 
In the treaty law dealing with weaponry there are frequent examples of 
treaties negotiated to address weapons seen at the time as excessively in-
jurious or as injuring an adversary in a way that pricked the international 
conscience. It tends to be the combined effect of the development made 
in the relevant weapons technology and the degree, or perhaps lack, of ef-
fective defences against those new developments, which constitute the 
threat that, in turn, prompts the negotiation of a legal instrument. Some-
times it is the humanitarian concern aroused by the nature and/or extent 
of the anticipated injury or death that is the primary motive here; some-
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times it is the recognition by certain states that the technology that others 
possess poses a potentially unanswerable threat.109 
   
At the time of writing, technological advances in weaponry are heavily con-
centrated in the traditional weapons manufacturing States such as the Unit-
ed States and Russia. Yet, nanotechnology is a transformative technology 
that is being acquired and developed at an alarming pace even in countries 
that have traditionally been considered technologically under-developed, 
such as India, Iran and Thailand.110 While one may expect that the pre-
existing technological capabilities would provide an advantage for techno-
logically developed countries in the arms race involving nanotechnology, 
well-developed weapons manufacturing infrastructures, procurement pro-
cesses and integrated weapons systems based on conventional technologies 
do not easily allow them to undertake the major restructure or overhaul of 
existing military infrastructures necessary to take advantage of nanotechno-
logical innovation. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to a nano-
technological arms race; whether it is considered to pose a potentially un-
answerable threat; and then what will be the effect on the debate concern-
ing the meaning of humanity when people are facing the ultimate precision 
strikes.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
109. BOOTHBY, supra note 33, at 121–22. 
110. See DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, supra note 2, at 30–33. 
